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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEANNA FOXLEY : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
WILLIAM N. FOXLEY : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
APPELLANT'S RESPONSE 
TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 890493-CA 
Appeal from the Third 
Judicial District Court 
Hon. Richard H. Moffat 
IN RESPONSE to Respondent's Brief, Appellant would make the 
following Arguments. 
DISPUTED FACTS 
A. Appellant admits the parties were married for seven (7) 
years. 
The Appellant's statement in his Brief was that the 
parties lived together for five and one-half (5 1/2) years before 
separating. 
B. Respondent voluntarily did not increase her work. 
Respondent argues form over substance of the evidence 
at trial. The representation of the dialogue by Respondent is 
1 
accurate. 
C. Appellant's income is disputed. 
1. Both parties are in disagreement over Appellant's 
1987 income. 
Because both parties are using the? same document, 
i.e. Appellant's 1987 income tax return. The actual income after 
deduction for business expenses is $72,166. 
The issue is what figure should be used to plug 
into the Uniform Child Support Schedule for Appellant's income. 
Appellant would argue that a figure that nets out 
reasonable and ordinary business expenses is the one that should 
be used. 
2. Trial of this matter commenced in September, 1988 
and concluded in March of 1989. 
At the time of trial, Appellant's accountant had 
not completed his income tax returns for 1988 nor was it due 
(TR2:12-15) . Respondent tries to imply that Appellant was 
attempting to hide his income which is not the case. 
The Court found that Appellant's income was as 
high as $224,000.00 per year. 
Appellant would assert that this figure was pulled 
out of thin air. 
Respondent's references to Appellants income are 
made from self imposed deductions which are in conflict with the 
express testimony of Dr. Foxley and the record. 
2 
Respondent states that Dr. Foxley earned $112,358 
from his Winslow practice and cites (TR2/106:12-15). 
When page 106 of TR2 is read, it is clear that he 
earned $90,000.00 from the Winslow practice. 
The income figures in the Findings of Fact have no 
basis. 
D. Respondent testified that he would shortly pay 
$75,000.00 per year for liability insurance (TR107:18-19) and 
represented in his brief that the $75,000.00 was an estimate. 
Appellant cannot see Respondent's point but would argue 
that his testimony that his insurance carrier, Mutual Insurance 
Company of Arizona, was significantly increasing liability 
insurance for an Obstetrician should not come as a great 
surprise, and is properly included as evidence of Dr. Foxley!s 
ability to pay. 
Liability insurance should be properly be deducted from 
gross earnings as a business expense. 
II 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The additional facts added to Respondent's Brief were 
part of Respondent's testimony concerning pre-divorce issues. 
The pre-divorce items were admitted over Appellant's objection. 
The Respondent uses net figures on tax returns 1983-
1986 but for 1987 goes to a gross figure, without business 
deductions. Again, this is inaccurate and inconsistent with the 
3 
approach used for the other years. The 1987 figure should be 
$72,166. 
Ill 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S RESPONSE 
A. Pre-Divorce issues should have been excluded and not 
made part of the Findings. 
The trial court ruled that it would not rely on the 
doctrine of equitable restitution, therefore, pre-divorce issues 
should not have been considered or made part of the Findings. 
B. The increase of alimony from $10.00 to $1,350.00 per 
month should be reversed. 
Due to the short marriage of the parties, the 
establishment of a yearly income level for Respondent of 
$45,456.00 was an abuse of discretion, not in line with Utah case 
law of the reasons for alimony, and a windfall to Respondent of 
$21,456.00 per year over the income needed to meet her expenses. 
The award of alimony in the amount of $16,200 per year 
is an abuse of discretion not supported by the evidence. 
C. The trial court's Findings are not supported by the 
evidence. 
The Respondent has not been accurate in the designation 
of Appellant's 1987 income. It is the 1987 income figure that 
was used to establish the estimates for Appellant's future 
4 
earnings, which are also in error. 
Using the same method as Respondent used to calculate 
Appellant's income from 1983 through 1986, Appellant should have 
income for 1988 of $72,166.00 
The figures used by the Respondent and the Court in 
establishing the figure of $6,985.00 per month used as the basis 
of Appellant's child support obligations are nowhere to be found 
in the record. 
The child support award should be reversed. 
D. The Court committed reversible error in awarding an 
increase of child support to $1,547.00 per month increasing to 
$1,638.00 per month. 
The child support worksheet is hearsay under Rule 
801(a) and (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and not excepted by 
Rules 802 and 901. 
Because a proper foundation was not laid to introduce 
the worksheet and because the worksheet was hearsay introduced 
and submitted after the trial of this matter, the Court should 
reverse the award of the District Court which predicated child 
support on this worksheet. 
At the minimum, child support should be set at 
$1,044.00 per month based on the worksheet submitted by 
Appellant. 
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E. The Court erred in not giving Appellant's Motion for 
Directed Verdict. 
F. The Court committed reversible error in awarding 
respondent attorney's fees. 
Respondent argues that a District Court can take 
judicial notice of the amount of attorney's fees it awards to a 
party which were submitted ten (10) days after the close of 
trial. 
Article II Rule 201(b) Utah Rules of Evidence outlines 
the requisites for judicial notice. 
Because of the nature of attorney's fees and because 
the record does not support the Respondent's notion that the 
Court took judicial notice, the argument of Respondent must fail 
and attorney's fees must be reversed. 
G. The Court should have found Respondent in contempt of 
court and either dismissed her case or awarded Appellant a new 
trial. 
After the trial Appellant presented new evidence to the 
trial that the Respondent had committed perjury. 
These accusations included the fact that the Respondent 
had purchased an interest in an airplane for $4,500.00 when she 
told the Court at trial she could not pay her mortgage or 
property taxes. 
6 
The evidence also includes allegations of an 
undisclosed bank account, $19,000.00 expenditures to fix up her 
home and the purchase of a new home. 
The Court dismissed Appellantfs motion without further 
evidentiary hearing or inquiry. 
Most of these allegations are not denied but Respondent 
argues they are harmless error. 
Appellant argues that it was reversible error not to 
dismiss Respondent's petition or grant him a new trial. 
H. Judge Moffat should have been recused for allegations 
of prejudice in an affidavit submitted by Appellant. 
IV 
ARGUMENT 
A. Pre-Divorce Issues should have been excluded. 
The Court ruled from the onset of the hearing that it 
would not use the elements stated in Martinez v. Martinez, 754 
P2d 69 (Utah App 1988). 
Because of this ruling a full evidentiary hearing on 
pre-divorce matter was avoided including evidence that Mrs. 
Foxley had attempted to get Dr. Foxley kicked out of medical 
school preferred by Appellant but rejected by the Court. 
7 
Appellant argues that the trial courtfs mind-set was to 
award the Respondent equitable restitution and to legitimize that 
award under the broad discretion of change of circumstances 
analysis. 
The initial draft of factual findings contained a 
plethora of pre-divorce factual matters. 
Although amended, they still include pre-divorce facts 
which are not harmless error, but a basis for the alimony 
increase, which is an abuse of discretion. 
B. Increase of alimony from $10.00 to $1,350.00 per month 
should be reversed. 
1. Respondent has erred on page 8 of her Brief. 
The original decree did not provide the language as 
emphasized. 
This language was replaced and signed by Judge Conder 
(see original Decree of Divorce in the record). 
2. Respondent in her response merges child support and 
alimony issues. 
The point that is made by Appellant and not addressed 
by Respondent is that the evidence does not support the level of 
alimony and child support set by the Court. 
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The Court found that Respondent makes about $9,600.00 
per year (Finding 22), awarded her alimony of $16,200 per year 
and child support of $19,656 for a yearly income level of 
$45,456.00, 
Nowhere is there a finding as to what she actually 
needs in terms of dollars and cents that corresponds to the award 
given. No figure was presented nor was there sufficient evidence 
presented for the Court to deduce such a figure. 
The Respondent's testimony was that she would spend 
$2,000.00 per month at a desired standard of living (TR2/80:11), 
leaving a windfall of $21,456.00. 
This figure does not take into consideration that she 
is only working part-time, that she has her bachelor's degree and 
was to receive her Master's Degree in sociology in May of 1989. 
Appellant recognizes that alimony is more than a 
mechanical award of dollars, but in turn, argues that such an 
award must be consistent with evidence offered and the purposes 
of alimony as enumerated by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Currently there are three branches of alimony under 
Utah law. 
The first line of cases attempts to maintain the wife 
at a standard of living that she enjoyed during the marriage, 
English v. English, 565 P2nd 409 (Utah 1977). 
Clearly the parties were in a financially depressed 
state and this criteria is inappropriate. 
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The second line of cases is the emerging area of 
equitable restitution, Martinez (supra), which the trial court 
ruled would not be considered. 
The third line is to rehabilitate the spouse so as not 
to become a public charge, English (supra), Gramme v. Gramme 587 
P2d 144 (Utah 1978), and in the case of long term marriage, some 
permanent award Jones v. Jones 700 P2d 1072 (Utah 1985), Olson v. 
Olson 704 P2d 564 (Utah 1985). 
The marriage of the Foxleys, unlike case authority 
cited by Respondent, is a very short one. The parties lived 
together for only 5 1/2 years and were divorced after 7 years. 
Further, the Respondent testified that she pulled herself off 
welfare in 1984, earned a Bachelor!s Degree in 1984, would earn a 
Master's Degree in May, 1989. She lost her pctrt-time job and 
refused to increase her hours at her other part-time job. 
Appellant does not argue that Respondent has not 
presented that she has needs. The Court on the other hand should 
not supplement Mrs. Foxley because she chooses to buy an interest 
in an airplane for $4,500.00 instead of paying her mortgage, 
property taxes and buying milk for the children. 
Absent proper pleadings and evidence that she is 
entitled to equitable restitution or some other form of relief 
which should have been presented at the initial trial in 1983, 
the Court abuses its discretion to set a standard of living which 
now allocates the Appellant's 1989 income without any basis and 
which is $21,000.00 over her required standard of living. 
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This court should reverse the alimony award to 
Respondent or at the minimum have the trial court set the level 
of need in terms of dollars and cents consistent with 
Respondent's testimony of need and prospective future earnings. 
C. The trial court's findings are not supported by the 
evidence. 
1. Respondent is inconsistent and inaccurate in income 
figures she presents in her Brief which is the basis for 
Appellantfs numerous foundational objections. 
For example, on page 3 of her Brief, Respondent 
represents that Appellant earned $112,358. 
The accurate figure is correctly represented on page 25 
of her brief at $90,000.00. 
The point is that Respondent submitted a child support 
schedule after her case was closed without foundation based on 
inaccurate figures that she still uses in her brief, and which 
have absolutely no foundation in the record. 
2. Finding No. 17 is still without foundation or support 
in the record. 
The $112,000.00 figure for 1987 was a gross figure 
before deduction for business expenses which was Respondent's 
trial exhibit No. 7. 
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Clearly on Schedule C, it shows that Appellant incurred 
business expenses, insurance, office expenses, etc., leaving him 
actual income of $56,087.00 plus $16,031.00 for a total of 
$72,166.00. 
The trial court apparently doubled the $112,000.00 
gross figure without any questions being asked to establish 
Appellant's income for 1988. 
The Respondent then did not compute or place into the 
record business expenses that should be discounted. 
It is not equitable to peg Appellant's income at a 
gross figure that does not deduct his normal business expenses 
for office help, insurance, etc. 
3. Finding No. 21 - Child Support Schedule. 
Where is the figure of $6,985.00 per month as the 
Defendant's adjusted gross income in the record? It is not, nor 
are there any figures in the record that could be added, 
subtracted, multiplied or divided to arrive at that figure. 
Where is the deduction for Defendant's health insurance 
contribution for the children that is clearly in the record 
(TR2/101:17-21). 
The Respondent submitted the Child Support Schedule 
after the case had been closed, using figures not in evidence and 
without foundation or basis. As a result, the award should be 
reversed. 
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D. The Court committed reversible error in awarding 
Respondent child support in the amount of $1,547,00 per month, 
which subsequently increased to $1,638.00 on April 15, 1989. 
1. There was no competant evidence introduced to 
support the child support increase. 
The Appellant concedes that his income increased 
significantly since the time of the divorce. 
The Respondent goes far afield by advancing the 
proposition that the child support worksheet is not evidentiary 
and subject to the same foundational and other requirements of 
the Rules of Evidence. 
The issue is what dollar figure the Court should 
have plugged into the child support worksheet to arrive at a 
monthly child support amount and whether the child support 
worksheet was admissable into evidence. 
The authority for Appellant's objection is 
elementary. 
Domestic hearings are subject to the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 101 and Rule 1101 
The worksheet is hearsay under Article VIII Rule 
801(a) and (b). 
The worksheet contains a written amount that 
purports to be the Appellant's net income as defined by the 
Uniform Child Support Schedule instructions. 
It was offered for the purpose of determining how 
much child support the Appellant would pay. 
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There was no foundation offered as to where the 
figure used by the Respondent came from. 
It would appear that an income figure on a child 
support schedule wouldnot come within the exceptions offered 
under rule 803 or 901 Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The Respondent argues that a copy of the child 
support schedule was filed prior to trial attached to a 
memorandum as well as after the close of trial. 
This position is apparently in response to the 
trial judge's position "...well, I suppose under the rules, he 
can file those guideline worksheets any time you want to..." 
(TR2/112:23-24). 
What rules the judge refers to are unknown. 
The Respondent filed various pleadings which 
contained prayers for child support. 
March 22, 1985 $1,000.00 child support 
March 6, 1986 900.00 child support 
February 26, 1988 (Memorandum) 1,600.00 child support 
September 15, 1988 (Memorandum) 1,858.14 child support 
Attached (Exhibit "A") is a copy of the schedule 
attached to Respondent's September 15, 1988 Memorandum, which she 
apparently refers to in her Brief as the one filed before trial, 
which is different than the one filed after trial. 
It was the one that was filed after trial, that 
apparently is the one the trial court adopted. 
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Even the dollar figures used in Respondent's Brief 
do not jive with the Amended Findings of Fact signed by the 
Court. 
Trial Exhibit No. 7, which is attached as Exhibit 
"B" in Respondent's Brief, shows that Appellant earned $72,166. 
Where the Court and the Respondent came up with 
$120,000.00 per year is unknown and certainly not supported by 
the record or even used in Respondent's child support worksheet 
submitted after the trial ended. 
Respondent argues in her brief that her part-time 
income is $600.00 per month. Finding No. 22 of the Amended 
Findings of Fact indicate that the Plaintiff/Respondent had 
adjusted gross, part-time income of $800.00 per month and that 
Defendant/Appellant had adjusted gross income of $6,985.00 per 
month. 
Where the Respondent and Court deduced that figure 
is similarly a puzzle. 
The Uniform Guidelines require that the obligor 
get a credit for health insurance. 
There is unrefuted evidence that the Appellant 
pays $375.00 per month in health insurance, which the Respondent 
chose not to include in its worksheet (TR2/101:17-21) 
The Court clearly erred in allowing the worksheet 
to be submitted after trial while using it as the evidence that 
it used to set child support. 
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The Court should have granted Appellant a directed 
verdict after Respondent rested. 
At the minimum, the Court should have set child 
support at $1,044.00 per month which was the only competant 
evidence before the court (TR2/103:1-3). 
The case of Naylor v. Naylor 700 P2d 707 (Utah 
1985) does not help the Respondent because it is clear from the 
Amended Findings that the Court was using the Uniform Child 
Support Schedule to set child support (see Amended Findings No. 
21, 22, 23, 24, and 25) . 
E. The Court erred in not granting Appellantfs Motion for 
Directed Verdict. 
For reason as outlined in both Appellant's initial 
Brief and this Response, the Court should have granted 
Appellant's post-judgment motion. 
F. The Court committed reversible error in awarding 
Respondent Attorneyfs Fees. 
Appellant submits that he is on sound ground in 
requesting a reversal of the award to Respondent of Attorney's 
fees. 
Respondent's only argument is that the award is 
supported by judicial notice. 
Nowhere does the record support a Finding that the 
trial court took judicial notice of the elements that Respondent 
was required to establish Talley v. Talley 739 P2d 83 (Utah App 
16 
1987). 
Article II Rule 201(b) Utah Rules of Evidence outline 
the requisites for a judicially noticed fact. 
First, they must be a fact generally known within the 
territory and second, capable of accurate and ready determination 
by a resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably 
questioned. 
The Rule further provides for an opportunity to be 
heard. 
In this case, there is nothing in the record to support 
that the Court took judicial notice of respondent's attorneys1 
fees. 
Further, because of the elements that go into the 
determination of attorney's fees, they are not items that are 
susceptible to judicial notice and should be reversed. 
G. The Court should have found Respondent in contempt of 
Court and either dismissed her case or awarded Appellant a new 
trial. 
After trial the Appellant discovered evidence that 
alleged that the Respondent had kept a second bank account 
without disclosing it, had purchased an interest in an airplane 
for $4,500.00 without disclosing it, and all the while telling 
the Court that she could not pay her mortgage or property taxes. 
Further, the Respondent promptly bought a new home 
after the trial and after she sent a bill to the mortgage holder 
for some $19,000.00 she claimed she expended on the home that, at 
17 
trial, she claimed she had no money to repair. 
The Respondent denies none of these facts in her Brief. 
She relies on the trial Judge's response that he was not 
convinced. 
It was an absolute abuse of discretion and travesty to 
the judicial system in Utah not to take some form of action 
concerning these allegations. 
At the very least, the Court could have held an 
evidentiary hearing to investigate these charges and extended 
Appellant thirty (30) days to complete his investigation. 
H. Judge Moffat should have been excused. 
Attached is a copy of Appellant's Affidavit to Recuse 
Judge Moffat. Clearly it went further than Respondent asserts. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court in this case grossly abused its discretion 
in both evidentiary matter and matters of law. As a result, the 
case should be reversed and dismissed or a new trial should be 
granted. 
Further, Appellant should be awarded his cost and attorney's 
fees incurred as a result of this appeal. 
DATED this 7 day of January, 1 
sfeKkG S. roV(5tfSEN 
£ Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this _l 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Respq 
first class mail, postage pre-padPd to PI 
attorney, Robert Hughes at: 1000 ^al^ey Towei 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
January, 1990 a 
e Was mailed via 
f/Resondent!s 
West Broadway, 
Foxley/BriefII 
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IN THE 
SALT LAKE 
THTPFI DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY 
Defendant. 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY) 
Civil NO.D82 1591 
AVAILABLE INCOME 
Gross Monthly Income 
Pre-Existing Alimony or Child Support 
Orders You Have Paid 
PJaJnlifi 
U 590.00 
21 e 
Defendant Combined 
lb 8 , 3 3 3 . (+) 
2b 9 
Adjusted Gross Income 3a 590 
(#1a - #2a - #3a, #lb - #2b - #3b, #3i + #3b - #3c) 
Proportionate Share of Combined Income 4a .07 < 
(#3a - #3c - #4a, #3b - #3c - #4b) 
3b 8 , 3 3 3 
4b , 9 3 * 
3c 8 , 9 2 3 . 0 0 
CHILD SUPPORT NEED 
Age Group 0 - 6 
Number of Children per Age Group 5a 1 
(#5a f #5b + #5c • #5d) 
Schedule Amount per Child 6a 578 
7-15 
Sb 2 
16-18 
Sc 9 Sd 3 
6b 710 6c 6 
(use the combined adjusted gross income from #3c and the schedule appropriate to the 
total number of children in #5d) 
Total Amount 7a 578 7b 1420 7c 9 
(#5a x #6a - #7a, #5b x #6b - #7b, #5c x #6c - #7c, #7a • #7b • #7c - #7d) 
7dX-9-28.00 
Work-Related Child Care Costs 
Health and Dental Insurance Premiums For Children 
Total Support Need 
(#7d • #8 • #9 - #10) 
8_L 
9 » 
101998 .00 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
Share of Obligation 
(#4a x #10 - #11a, #4b x #10 « #11b) 
Credit for Actual Payments in #8 and #9 
Parent's Total Child Support Obligation 
(#lla - #12a - #13a. #llb - #12b - #13b) 
11a 1 3 9 . 0 0 
12a 9 
l l b l 8 5 8 . 1 4 
12b 9 
13a 1 3 9 . 0 0 I 3 b l 8 5 8 . 1 4 
The extended visitation amount applies only to the non-custodial parent and to those 
months in which the order specifies that the child spend at least 25 of 30 consecutive days 
with that parent. 
Amount Paid During Extended Visitation 
(#13a x .75 - #14a, #13b x .75 - #14b) 
14a_ 14b 
A. 
ROBERT W. HUGHES (1573) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)534-1074 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DEANNA 
vs. 
WILLIAM 
FOXLEY 
N. 
t / 
Plaintiff, ) 
FOXLEY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
THIS MATTER came on for trial on September 22, 1988, at the 
hour of 2:00 p.m. and was subsequently continued to March 7, 1989 
at the hour of 10:00 a.m. on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify a 
Decree of Divorce before the Honorable Richard H. Moffatt, Judge 
of the above-entitled Court, sitting without jury. The 
Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley, was represented by Robert W. Hughes and 
the Defendant, William N. Foxley, was represented by Greg S. 
Ericksen. 
The Court having heard testimony and received evidence, 
argument to the Court having been made, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises is now prepared to enter its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married October 8, 
1 
1976. At the time of the marriage, the Plaintiff was an 
undergraduate student and the Defendant was a graduate student at 
Boise State University. 
2. The divorce trial was heard on June 30, 1983, a Decree 
of Divorce was signed on August 22, 1983 and entered on August 
23, 1983 to become final three months from the time of entry. 
3. At the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff was 
unemployed and had no income and the Defendant was a student and 
had an income, not including amounts received from student loans, 
of approximately $50.00 per month. 
4. That at the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff had 
expenses of $1,070.00 per month, the Defendant had expenses of 
$895.00 per month. 
5. The Defendant graduated from the University of Utah 
Medical School in June of 1983. 
6. During the parties marriage the parties had four minor 
children to wit: Christine, born September 19, 1970. (Christine 
was the daughter of the Plaintiff by a prior marriage who was 
adopted by the Defendant in October of 1980.); Sarah, born May 
23, 1977; Noall, born July 13, 1979; and Corinne, born April 15, 
1982. 
Q During the marriage, the Plaintiff could not pursue her 
formal education due to frequent relocations of the Defendant in 
pursuing his medical career, because Plaintiff was employed at 
2 
various times during the marriage to assist in the support of the 
family, and due to the fact that Plaintiff was pregnant for a 
major portion of the time. 
The parties acquired few household furnishings, 
appliances or other personal property during the marriage. 
8. For approximately the two years after the parties were 
divorced, the Plaintiff and the parties minor children required 
and received public assistance. 
9. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has done an 
admirable job of caring for and educating the parties minor 
children. 
10. The Court finds that the Plaintiff and the minor 
children have endured substantial hardships since the time of the 
divorce. 
11. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has made significant 
personal sacrifices to further her education since the time of 
the divorce. After the divorce, Plaintiff obtained her bachelors 
degree in Sociology and expects to receive her masters degree in 
1989. Plaintiff anticipates pursuing a Ph.D. Length of time for 
completion of this course of study will depend on course 
requirements. 
12. The Plaintiff intends to continue with her education in 
an effort to maximize her income potential. The testimony and 
evidence admitted at trial indicates that the prospects of the 
Plaintiff finding well-paid and full-time employment in her field 
will be difficult without additional education and that aven with 
3 
additional education, employment opportunities are projected to 
be limited in the future. 
13. During the year 1987, the Plaintiff worked as a part-
time employee and had a gross income of $9,600.00. 
14. In 1987, the Defendant moved to Winslow, Arizona where 
he is the only medical doctor who specializes in obstetrics and 
gynecology in that vicinity. 
15. During the year 1987, the last year which the Defendant' 
was able to provide a tax return, the Defendant had a gross 
income of $128,437.00. The Defendant's 1987 income was comprised 
of wages he received $16,031.00 as an employee, for approximately 
6 months, at the Huerly Medical Center in Michigan, and from the 
private practice of medicine. The Defendant earned $112,406.00 
from his private medical practice in approximately 6 months of 
practice. 
16. The earnincfs of the Defendant as well as his future 
potential have been considered by the court for the purpose of 
determining whether the amount of alimony should be modified. 
17. The Defendant's present income is not completely clear 
but the Court finds based upon the evidence that his gross income 
can be interpreted as being as high as $224,000.00 a year but 
certainly under no circumstances less than approximatelv 
$120,000.00 per year. 
18. The Defendant was able to contribute $41,660.00 to a 
Keogh Retirement Plan in 1987 and he anticipated contributing a 
similar amov.nt to a retirement plan in 1988. 
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19. The Court finds that there has been a substantial 
change of circumstances in the parties income since the time of 
the divorce. 
20. Based upon the changes of circumstances, a modification 
of the decree of divorce is warranted. The Court does not, 
however, find it necessary to invoke the theory of "Equitable 
Restitution" as annunciated by the Utah Courts of Appeals nor is 
it necessary to the Court to invoke the provisions of the 
original divorce decree, wherein Judge Condor awarded an interest 
in the Defendant's medical degree to the Plaintiff, since the 
change of circumstances and the needs of the Plaintiff and the 
minor children are sufficient to justify a modification of the 
decree. 
21. Based upon the change of circumstances and the needs of 
the children, child support to be paid by the Defendant should be 
increased to the appropriate amount reflected in the judicial 
district's support guidelines. 
22. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has an adjusted 
gross part-time income of $800.00 per month and that the 
Defendant has an adjusted gross income, after the subtractions of 
his minimum necessary expenses, in excess of $6,985.00 per month. 
23. The proportionate share of the parties combined income 
is 10% and 90% for the Plaintiff and the Defendant respectively. 
24. The Court finds that based upon the Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's combined adjusted gross incomes, the amount of child 
support per child should be the sum of $607.00 per month for the 
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minor children Sarah and Noall and should be the amount of 
$504.00 for the parties youngest child, Corinne, for a total 
child support amount of $1,718.00, monthly, for all three minor 
children. The Defendant, pursuant to the support guidelines, 
should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $1,549.00 for child 
support. The Court further finds that the amount of child 
support for Corinne should increase to the sum of $607.00 per 
month beginning on April 15, 1989, since she will be 7 years of 
age on that date. Therefore, beginning on April 15, 1989, the 
Defendant's child support obligation will increase to $1,638.00 
per month, $546.00 per month per minor child. 
25. The Court further finds that pursuant to the support 
guidelines, the child support to be paid by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff should be decreased by 25% during those periods which 
the Defendant has extended visitation of 25 consecutive or more 
days with the minor child(ren). 
26. The Court finds that at the time of the hearing the 
Plaintiff was in arrears in property taxes for her residence in 
excess of $3,000.00 and that the Plaintiff's residence was in 
jeopardy of being sold by the county for back property taxes; 
that the Plaintiff is nine payments behind on her mortgage 
payments; that the Plaintiff has incurred substantial debts for 
medical, dental and orthodontic expenses for the children; that 
the home where the Plaintiff and the minor children reside is in 
poor condition and is in need of substantial and major repairs, 
including repairs to the roof, foundation, interior and exterior 
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walls and plumbing, rebuilding of the back entry into the home, 
as well as other repairs; and, that the Plaintiff and the 
children are in need of new appliances and household furnishings, 
including beds, furniture, a washer and dryer, a stove and also 
new clothing and shoes. 
The Plaintiff is currently living in the same home as 
when the Decree was entered. 
27. The Court finds that at the time of the modification 
hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of 
the parties, that the Plaintiff has a real and substantial need 
for an increase in alimony and that she has endured substantial 
and significant personal hardships since the time of the divorce. 
28. The Court finds that it is just and equitable that the 
monthly alimony to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff 
should be increased from $10.00 to the sum of $1,350.00 per 
month. Payment of alimony to commence as of April 19, 1989. 
29. The Court further finds that the Defendant should be 
required to provide health and dental insurance for the minor 
children of the parties. The Court further finds that it is 
equitable and just that any medical or dental expenses, including 
orthodontic expenses, not paid by health and dental insurance 
should be divided equally between the parties. 
30. The Court finds that attorney's fees should be awarded 
to the Plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable attorney's 
fees would be the sum of $4,394.00 plus her costs incurred 
herein. 
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31. The Court finds that that the Plaintiff's Counsel's 
fees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and considering 
the length of time expended and the complexities of the issues, 
the above award of attorney's fees is reasonable. 
32. That the Court did not consider whether alimony should 
be terminated but would entertain further hearing upon 
application of either party or future petitions for modification. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There has been a substantial change of circumstances 
since the Decree of Divorce was originally entered in this 
matter. 
2. It is fair and reasonable, based upon the change of 
circumstances, that the amount of child support to be paid by the 
Defendant should be increased in accordance with the schedules 
set forth in the child support guidelines. 
3. The child support to be paid by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff for support of the parties minor children should 
increase to the amount of $1,549.00 per month for the three minor 
children. The amount of child support to be paid by the 
Defendant to the Plaintiff for the support of the parties minor 
children should be increased to the amount of $1,638.00 per 
month, $546.00 per child per month, beginning April 15, 1989. 
4. The Plaintiff has endured and continues to endure 
significant and substantial hardships and has made significant 
and substantial sacrifices since the time of the divorce and she 
8 
has a significant and substantial need at present and in the 
future for an increase in alimony. 
5, It is fair and reasonable that the amount of alimony 
payable from the Defendant to the Plaintiff be increased to 
$1,350.00 per month, commencing April 19, 1989. 
6, The Defendant should provide health, accident and 
dental insurance for the parties minor children and any medical 
and dental costs, including orthodontic treatments, which are not 
paid by medical insurance shall be divided equally between the 
parties. 
7. It is just and reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded 
attorney's fees in the amount of $4,394.00 plus costs incurred 
9 
GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002 
Attorney for Defendant 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Ut 84010 
Telephone:(801)295-6841 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY, } 
) AFFIDAVIT OF GREG S. ERICKSEN 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY, ) JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Defendant. ) CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
COMES NOW Greg S. Ericksen Attorney at Law who in support of 
Defendant's motion to disqualify, and after being placed under 
oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That he is the Attorney of record for Defendant and is 
familiar with this matter. 
2. That certain situations have arisen in phe matter and 
that Defendant has the opinion that the Judge assigned to this 
case has demonstrated a bias that would prevent him from having a 
fair hearing and has directed me to seek another Judge to hear 
issues involved herein. 
3. That the case at bar involves the following general 
issues: 
A. Plaintiff has petitioned the Court for a 
Modification of the Divorce Decree, requesting an 
increase in child support and alimony. 
B. That Defendant has asserted Plaintiff is in 
CVUIOIT r~> 
contempt of court for willful refusal to allow him 
visitation of his children and for intentional 
interference of his visitation rights. 
4. That at a prior hearing in this matter, Judge Richard 
Moffat upon his own motion interviewed the children of the 
Parties in camera and made a suggestion that Defendant was 
largely responsible for visitation problems as he did not spend 
time with his children and that if he didn't spend time, that the 
Court may well limit his visitation. Said remarks were made 
without a full evidentiary hearing on the matter. 
5. That Defendant is a physician practicing medicine out 
of state and has done so for the last six or seven years. 
6. That the crux of Defendant's pleadings and petitions to 
find Plaintiff in contempt was that every year Defendant would 
set aside time to visit his children due to the fact that he is a 
physician and out of state. Defendant alleges that every year 
Plaintiff would willfuly refuse to let the children visit the 
Defendant during this vacation time and that he would have to 
petition the Court and that by the time he received the children 
for visitation, his vacation period had run its course and that 
visitation had to take place around a different schedule. 
Further, Defendant has alleged and will offer testimony that 
Plaintiff has withheld gifts and cards he has sent to this 
children and has refused to let Defendant talk to his children by 
phone when he calls. 
7. For this and other reasons, Defendant has filed a 
petition requesting the Court to find Plaintiff in contempt for 
intentional interference with visitation and interaction between 
he and his children. 
8. That on June 6, 1988, Defendant sent a letter to 
Plaintiff requesting visitation during July 11, 1988 through 
August 15, 1988. 
9. That approximately three days prior to the designated 
time for visitation, I received a call from Plaintifffs attorney 
advising me that unless Defendant agreed to shorten his 
visitation to 3 weeks that Plaintiff would not let the children 
go based on the fact that Judge Moffat had suggested that 
visitation may be shortened if Defendant didn't agree to spend 
more time with his children. 
10. That Dr. Foxley was again faced with not having his 
vacation time to visit with his children. 
11. As a result, on July 11, 1988 at the hour of 1:00 p.m., 
the day set for visitation, counsel for Plaintiff and myself 
placed a conference call to Judge Moffat regarding visitation. 
12. That as I recall, the conversation, Judge Moffat 
informed Plaintiff's counsel that he would not limit visitation, 
but that if Defendant did not spend time with the children that 
he may order them home. 
13. That the children left to visit with Defendant on or 
about July 13, 1988, two days after visitation was to commence. 
14. That during the week of August 1, 1988 or approximately 
during that time, I received a call from Robert Hughes, 
Plaintiff's counsel, requesting that the youngest child be 
returned home because she was homesick. 
15. That after talking with Dr. Foxley, I advised 
Plaintiff's counsel that my client had advised me that things 
were going great and that the only problem was that Plaintiff had 
told the children that they only had to stay for three weeks and 
that Plaintiff wanted the children to go to Montana with her 
prior to the end of five weeks that Defendant had the children. 
16. That I was out of the state the week of August 8, 1988. 
17. That on or about August 9, 1988, I received a call from 
my office informing me that Plaintiff's attorney was going to 
have a hearing on August 10, 1988 to get a court order, ordering 
the children immediately returned. 
18. That on August 9 and August 10, I tried to call 
Plaintiff's counsel but could not reach him, whereupon I spoke 
with Judge Moffat and registered my objection to such a hearing. 
Judge Moffat informed me that he would not have time to hear such 
a motion prior to his leaving for vacation on August 12, 1988, 
and that he would not sign an order. 
19. On August 11, 1988, I was informed by toy office that 
Plaintiff's counsel had called and that the Judge had agreed to 
sign an order for immediate return of the children. 
20. Upon contacting Plaintiff's counsel, he confirmed what 
my office had told me, whereupon I advised him that in my view 
such an order was inappropriate and that I was shocked to learn 
that Plaintiff and his client had visited with the Judge 
concerning the matter. 
I informed him that I intended to file an appeal. 
21. That I received a massage from my office that Judge 
Moffat was upset and would find me personally in contempt and 
wanted me in his office first thing Friday morning, August 12, 
1988. 
22. That I unsuccessfully tried to reach the Judge and 
informed his clerk that it was impossible for me to get back to 
Salt Lake before Saturday, August 13. 
23. That the following week of August 15, I spoke with 
Plaintiff fs attorney who advised me that he was not going to 
pursue the contempt issue. 
I advised him that the children would be home on August 17, 
:sss. 
DATED this fcl day of September, 196d^ 
S. fffip-lcxsen 
rorney for Defendant 
The undersigned being a Notary Public does hereby certify 
that on this U& day of September, 1988 personally appeared 
before me GREG S. ERICKSEN, who executed the foregoing Affidavit. 
LRY PUBLIC" NOTAR
Residing at; lxu)& Ctx+tdu 
My commission expires: 
IN THE DISTRICT GCURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SAUT IAKE OOUNIY, STATE OF UTAH 
Deanna F o x l e y 
Plaintiff , 
v s . 
William M. Foxley 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CIVIL NO. DB2-1591 
The Court having received the Amended Affidavit of Greg S. Ericksen the 
attorney for the defendant in the above entitled matter and his Certificate 
of Counsel all pursuant to rule 63B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
having considered same finds that the amended affidavit is insufficient in 
law as well as in fact and declines to recuse himself fram the hearing in 
the above entitled matter. The undersigned states that he in no way biased 
or prejudiced for' or against either of the parties in said matter and feels 
that the defendant has misunderstood some of the prDrojnoements of the Court 
or seme of the rulings of the Court. In addition the problem that arose 
regarriing the visitation during the first week of August, 1988, **iich ended 
with an exparte order being granted has not been accurately reported to 
defense counsel and his statements regarding the Ccurts attitude in regard 
EXHIBIT D 
(2) 
to that matter are inaccairate. 
Dated this ^O day of September, 1988. 
